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Abstract This paper deals with a stochastic order-driven market model with
waiting costs, for orderbooks with heterogenous traders. Offer and demand of
liquidity drives price formation and traders anticipate future evolutions of the
orderbook. The natural framework we use is mean field game theory, a class of
stochastic differential games with a continuum of anonymous players. Several
sources of heterogeneity are considered including the mean size of orders. Thus
we are able to consider the coexistence of Institutional Investors and High Fre-
quency Traders (HFT). We provide both analytical solutions and numerical
experiments. Implications on classical quantities are explored: orderbook size,
prices, and effective bid/ask spread. According to the model, in markets with
Institutional Investors only we show the existence of inefficient liquidity imbal-
ances in equilibrium, with two symmetrical situations corresponding to what
we call liquidity calls for liquidity. During these situations the transaction price
significantly moves away from the fair price. However this macro phenomenon
disappears in markets with both Institutional Investors and HFT, although a
more precise study shows that the benefits of the new situation go to HFT
only, leaving Institutional Investors even with higher trading costs.
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1 Introduction
With the recent changes in regulation on financial markets (MiFID, 2007, in
Europe and Reg NMS, 2005, USA) the competition across trading venues fa-
vored the appearance of new trading rules, in a global attempt to capture most
of the decreasing liquidity available in the post-2008 financial crisis world.
Trading venues thus proposed innovative ways to trade in electronic order-
books (that have the favor of regulators and policy makers because of their
native traceability):
– tiny tick sizes (i.e. the minimum price change between two consecutive
quotes [Hall et al., 2005]) to attract automated market orders using SORs
(Smart Order Routers [Page`s et al., 2011],
[Foucault and Menkveld, 2008]),
– low latency networks and matching engines, to allow high frequency play-
ers to decrease their exposure to market risk, in attempts to give them
incentive to provide more liquidity [Madhavan, 2011],
– maker/taker fee schedules to pay Liquidity Provider orders inserted in or-
derbooks, in order to attract liquidity,
– creation of Dark Pools of various kinds (see [Ganchev et al., 2010]), to pro-
mote anonymous liquidity seeking so that large investors can continue to
exchange blocks in an electronic manner,
– size-priority and pro-rata matching rules [Mendelson and Amihud, 1991]
to complement the usual time-priority models,
are among these changes in market microstructure.
The analysis of the efficiency of the emerging ecology of partially connected
trading pools is questioned, especially since the flash crash [Madhavan, 2011],
[Kirilenko et al., 2010] during which the US equity market has lost around
10% of its value in 10 minutes, regaining it in 20 minutes. The resiliency of
the liquidity provided by HFT (High Frequency Traders [Menkveld, 2010])
raised concerns. So did the dispersion of liquidity on such an heterogeneous
network of pools.
Addressing these points is difficult because the market microstructure is not
only a set of trading rules that could be studied statically, it changes with
market participants behaviors, each of them trying to optimize her own utility
function and anticipating others’ moves (see [Lehalle et al., 2013] and [Foucault et al., 2013]
for more details).
This article provides an order-driven market modeling, where the volume of
arriving flows is the risk source and where the key driver is the demand/offer
of liquidity.
Yet only a limited number of papers have explored such models, the most
notables being [Ros¸u, 2009] (modeling the orderbook queue dynamics) and
[Gareche et al., 2013] (empirically studying orderbook data to extract the main
components of the dynamics). The present paper can be seen as a very good
complement to those two very interesting ones: with an accurate economic
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modeling on the one hand, and empirical results on the other hand. The MFG
approach links them together since we provide for instance Partial Derivative
Equation formulations (compatible with the Fokker-Planck equation described
in the second paper) arising from a structural modeling (compatible with the
modeling of the first one). The problem is very complex, and the topic deserves
for more studies and publications. Indeed, such liquidity models involve a very
large number of traders who arrive and leave the system at different times and
strategically interact. Such components lead necessarily to complex situations.
In our model we consider smart traders (we call them players as soon as we
use the game theory environment) that arbitrate between limit and market or-
ders. That is they have to choose between the immediate transaction price and
expected later transaction prices. The dynamic model is in continuous time,
in infinite horizon. Since patience is at the heart of our model, the present
approach belongs to the family of waiting cost order-driven market models.
Closely related papers are the work of [Foucault et al., 2005], and the more
recent paper by [Ros¸u, 2009]. The former is the seminal waiting cost based
model (as opposed to asymmetry information models) in discrete time. The
latter is a continuous time approach where traders have the possibility to can-
cel their orders for free. This late assumption greatly simplifies the problem
and allows the author to describe the equilibrium in an elegant manner.
Like in [Ros¸u, 2009], we use a continuous time model with Poisson processes
used to model newcomers’ arrivals. Nevertheless our model present some im-
portant dissimilarities. First the patience structure of traders is more endoge-
nous since no cancellation of orders are permitted. Choices made by the players
are thus irreversible and traders’ anticipations of future events become a core
issue. Their is a deep impact on the equilibrium equations: the problem be-
comes nonlinear. Secondly, the goal of our paper is to study the case with
heterogenous traders, in particular to model the interactions of Institutional
Investors and High Frequency Traders. In [Ros¸u, 2009] several types of traders
are considered, but the strategical arbitrage between market and impact or-
ders is allowed only for one of the types. This is not the case in our model,
where all types make choices. Game theory is necessary as soon as markets
are incomplete. When markets are complete, strategy is unnecessary and the
only task agents have to perform is to optimize in regards to the price. Order-
driven markets are by essence incomplete since the source of risk is the random
arrival of traders, and it is impossible to hedge this risk because choices made
by traders are irreversible (note that the more realistic modeling where the
modeler considers costly cancellation of orders must lead to a similar incom-
pleteness). Consequently we are convinced that game theory offers a proper
framework.
Mean Field Games (MFG monotone systems, as detailed in the next sec-
tion) are the suitable class of games that naturally allow to take into ac-
count the specific components of the order-driven market we consider, that
is: a continuum of anonymous players, irreversibility of the actions, recursiv-
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ity (anticipation of future prices). The resulting dynamics is thus a mix of
backward-driven behaviors (based on actualized anticipations of future val-
ues of trades) and forward-driven ones (resulting from the immediate actions
taken by agents). The MFG framework has been built to capture this two way
dynamics, therefore this paper uses it to render the dynamics of a stylized
orderbook, allowing to obtain results on different market configurations. In
the paper we introduce a new kind of mean field games in which players take
one strategic decision at their arrival into the game.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a quick introduction
to Mean Field Game theory. In section 3 we introduce the modeling approach.
We start with a one-sided orderbook as a base camp towards the two-sided
orderbook exposed later. Section 4 and 5 are dedicated to the introduction
and theoretical study of the recursive equations characterizing the equilibrium.
Finally we conclude the paper in section 6, where we apply the model to several
markets: markets with Institutional Investors only versus markets with both
Institutional Investors and High Frequency Traders.
2 Mean Field Games: a quick introduction
Mean Field Games (MFG for short) are a class of stochastic differential games
with a continuum of agents.
They have been introduced by [Lasry and Lions, 2007]. Similar ideas have
been introduced from an engineering viewpoint by [Huang et al., 2007] and
[Adlakha et al., 2013]. From then on, MFG have known numerous develop-
ments and applications to various fields, mainly in economics [Lucas and Moll, 2013,
Gue´ant et al., 2010], statistics [Pequito et al., 2011a,Pequito et al., 2011b], and
human crowd behaviors [Lachapelle and Wolfram, 2011]. The mathematics
and numerics of MFG have been widely developed. Most of the mathematical
tools for MFG have been the purpose of a 5 years course at Colle`ge de France
[Lions, 2012], and recent developments are described in [Cardaliaguet et al., 2012]
from an analysis viewpoint and [Carmona et al., 2012] and [Carmona and Lacker, 2013]
with a probabilistic approach.
In the continuum, agents are atomized, which means that their influence on
the global state is reduced to nil. In economics, this aspect has to be linked
with the notion of price taker agents as opposed to the case of a price maker
monopolist for instance. This is precisely the whole continuum that makes the
equilibrium.
The nil influence may have other sources than the presence of infinitely many
players in the game. Indeed, a game with stochastic continuous entries and
exits of players leads to the same property. This will be in particular the case
of the model we propose in the present paper, where we consider Poisson
entries and exits.
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The information consists of a measure on the space of states S. Being a mea-
sure, it is often denoted by m in the literature, but to be consistent with the
notations of the model developped in the next sections, we rather call it x.
Then x(s) quantifies the density of agents having state s.
In a MFG, players individually optimize (by choosing actions) their expected
pay-off, considering the evolution of the global dynamic of the collectivity as
an observable parameter (and they anticipate its evolution). Simultaneously,
the statistical evolution of the collective dynamic follows from the individ-
ual optimal behaviors. The equilibrium takes place as soon as the anticipated
evolution coincides with the statistical evolution.
A core characteristic of Mean Field Games is that they are anonymous games.
This notion is well known and means that the game is invariant for any per-
mutation of the players. In other words, the players are not labelled. This
assumption is very natural in complex systems involving numerous players.
Mean Field Games are approximations of anonymous games with finitely many
players. But things are getting much simpler in MFG. The strategical pow-
erlessness of individuals (i.e. the atomized characteristic of players) dramat-
ically shrinks the traditional complexity (materialized by numerous coupling
of the equilibrium equations) of N -player games, which is well-known as being
Achilles’ heel of classical stochastic differential games. Players interact with
others only via the global state of the collectivity.
In N -player stochastic differential games, each player i optimizes her value
function ui, depending upon every individual states of agents (including her-
self). The equilibrium is then characterized by a complex system of coupled
differential equations.
In a Mean Field Game, the N value functions become a single value function
U depending upon the the state s of a generic player and the density x of the
continuum.
The MFG equilibrium is then characterized by a master equation verified by U .
The master equation is in general very tricky and mathematically challenging.
Their is a natural classification of cases in term of risk structure.
– Individual risk: in this case, the stochasticity of each player’s dynamic is
independent of each other. This particular case was firstly introduced. A
major simplification is that the value function does not depend on the den-
sity x, but only on the state s. Consequently the master equation reduces
to a system of two coupled partial differential equations having a forward-
backward structure. The dynamic of the collectivity is deterministic.
– Shared risk: here the only risk that agents face is common to all of them.
When agent’s space S is finite (that is x := (x1, ..., xM )), then the value
function can be discretized
U := (uj), uj(x1, . . . , xM ), j = 1, . . . ,M.
This class of cases have been deeply investigated and is referred to as the
case of monotone systems (see [Lions, 2012]). The monotone system takes
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the following form:
0 = −ruj −
N∑
k=1
αk(u, x)
∂uj
∂xk
+ βj(u, x), for j = 1, ...,M, (1)
where
u→ αj(u, x) is monotone for all j
u→ βj(u, x) is monotone for all j.
We will see later the PDE of our orderbook model falls into this class of
MFG.
Note that there is also a time dependent version of (1) with a time deriva-
tive term added.
– Mix models: some classes of cases that mix both shared and individual
risks are needed for economic modeling (e.g. for solving the Krussel-Smith
problem [Krusell and Smith, 1998]).
3 Model
The stylized orderbook used here is a two-sided one. We start with a simple
single-queue model as a base camp towards the two-sided one that is exposed
later.
3.1 A simple single-queue model with anticipations
The purpose of introducing first a single queue model is didactic and does
not aim at directly providing insights on orderbook modeling. However we
believe this single queue is the occasion to introduce some key concepts, such as
endogenous strategic entries of agents that anticipate the future. Consequently,
sellers entering the system are also called players since we locate the modeling
approach in the game theoretic framework (agents perform actions optimizing
their respective pay-off).
In particular, when new sellers arrive, they look at the queue size and decide
whether to enter the queue or not (action), after considering their expected
pay-off (value function assessment).
With this simplified model we introduce anticipatory behaviors in a very styl-
ized one-sided orderbook, where patient sellers arrive at exogenous Poisson
rate and where the arrival rate of impatient buyers increases as soon as the
queue size increases. We will finally use it to provide insights on the modeling
of distinct execution protocols, namely process sharing and First In First Out
protocol.
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The model. The arrival rate of players is continuous and stochastic. In this
simplified model, it is exogenous.
– As usual, they arrive following a Poisson process with intensity λ.
– Impatient buyers arrive at rate µ(x) ≥ 0, a given increasing function of x;
i.e. the more patient sellers in the queue, the higher arrival rate of impatient
buyers.
– The unit size of an order in the queue is q. The queuing discipline is a
process sharing one (with no priority), i.e. individual service in a queue
of size x is worth q/x. In terms of trading rules, one may think about a
pro-rata one [Field and Large, 2008].
– The pay-off gained by a player per unit of order is a nonnegative decreasing
function of the queue size: P (x). Typical cases are P (x) := p > 0 and
P (x) = 1/x. On the other hand, there is a cost c of waiting in the queue.
Now, as usual in game theory, there is a value function u for any player. The
value function depends upon the queue size x. It is the expected Profit & Loss
(P&L) of a player entering the queue. Note that we assume that agents are
risk neutral and that their reservation utility is set to 0, which means that
an agent decides to enter the queue as soon as the value function is positive:
u(x) > 0.
The value function dynamic comes from an infinitesimal expression of events
impacting it:
– a newcomer enters the queue as soon as u(x) > 0 (remember u is the
“expected value received if you enter the queue”).
– in the scope of this toy model, the queue is consumed by an exogenous
Poisson process of intensity µ(x). Each time an order already waiting in
the queue is partially executed (according to a prorata rule): its owner will
sell q/x shares for a price P (x). The new expected value for a participant
waiting in the queue in this case is thus q/x ·P (x)+(1−q/x) ·u(x−q) (i.e.
the first part of the expression comes from the sell of q/x shares and the
second one from the expected value of the queue that is now of size x− q).
– in all other cases, the expected value does not change.
– the waiting cost is proportional to q (the size of the orders); it decreases
the expected value of u by c q dt, where dt is the time unit.
A MFG formalization: 1. The Control. A subtle aspect of the MFG is players
enter into the game following Nλ, and take the decision to stay in the queue
or to leave the game (paying a reference price of zero). The natural notation
would be
– the index of an anonymous player i is i := Nλ,
– its control δi it naturally deduced from its value function ui(x) (the value
of staying in the queue). As soon as the value of staying in the queue is
greater than paying the reference price, it solves the control problem of the
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agent:
U i(xt) := max
δi∈{0,1}
δiui(x). (2)
The solution is hence easy to express:
δi = 1{ui(x)>0}.
– note that x, the size of the queue, is our mean field. Thanks to it u(x) is
shared by all the players.
The mean field xt evolves according to a stochastic differential equation:
dxt =
(
dNλt δ
i
t − dNµ(x)t
)
q, (3)
with the notations dN
µ(x)
t for the queue-consuming point process.
We see the mean field dynamics involves the value function ui and no more
the control once we inject the solution of the control problem in it (namely
δi = 1{ui(x)>0}):
dxt =
(
dNλt 1{ui(x)>0} − dNµ(x)t
)
q.
A MFG formalization: 2. Definition of the cost function. The value function
the ith agent wants to minimize is driven by the following running cost
dJ(xt) =
[ q
x t
P (xt) + (1− q
x t
)J(xt − q)
]
dN
µ(x)
t − cq dt. (4)
The additive waiting costs are compatible with the very short time scale having
a sense for orderbook dynamics1.
With such a formalism, the value function can be defined as
ui(X) = E
∫ T
t=0
Jui (xt) dt
given x0 = X, with T “large enough” at the intraday time sale. Remind that in
our specific class of MFG, the identity i of the agent and the time are bound:
i = Nλ, meaning players come into the game according to the point process
Nλ.
1 It can be noted here that another cost function J could be defined here as:
dJ (xt) = [ω(q, xt)P (xt) + (1− ω(q, xt))J (xt − q)] dNµ(x)t − cq dt,
where ω(q, xt) is a random variable taking value 1 with a probability q/x and 0 otherwise.
In such a case, instead of a prorata rule, we will have a trading rule for which an order is
fully executed with a probability q/x, or not at all. This case covers the trading model of
[Ros¸u, 2009], in which the orderbook matching rule is FIFO (First In, First Out), but any
agent can modify and reinsert his order at any time. In such a case the probability for one
specific agent to be first in the queue (and thus be fully filled), is q/x.
Since EdJ = EdJ , the emerging dynamics are the same.
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A MFG formalization: 3. Expression of the mean field. Thanks to the mean
field xt, the value function can be anonymized:
u(x) := ui(x) = E
∫ T
t=0
Ju(xt) dt, ∀i.
And thus the dynamics of the mean field is agent-agnostic too:
dxt =
(
dNλt 1{u(x)>0} − dNµ(x)t
)
q.
A MFG formalization: 4. Stationary equilibrium as a fixed point of the value
function. Thanks to the previous steps we now look for the stationary value of
u. Below we detail the equilibrium equation for each probability event, giving
birth in few paragraph to an ordinary differential equation describing the value
function.
u(x) = (1− λ1{u(x)>0}dt− µ(x)dt) · u(x) ← nothing happens (5)
+ λ1{u(x)>0}dt · u(x+ q) ← new queue entrance
+ µ(x)dt ·
( q
x
P (x) + (1− q
x
)u(x− q)
)
← service
− cq dt ← waiting cost
We can perform a Taylor expansion for small q in the discrete equation above.
In this way we derive the following differential equation:
0 =
µ(x)
x
(P (x)− u)−c+ (λ1{u>0}− µ(x))u′ +q
(1
2
(λ1{u>0}−µ(x))u′′+µ(x)
x
u′
)
,
where the second order term is the last one (blue term).
First order analysis. Before approximating numerically the solution to (5),
we propose to get some insights on the shape of the solution by doing a first
order analysis. More precisely, the solution to the queuing system described
above is characterized by the sign of the value function u. Consequently we
are interested in finding potential sign switching points of u.
The core modeling ingredient is the value of the Poisson arrival rate λ relative
to µ(x).
For the first order analysis we look at the first order equation:
0 =
µ(x)
x
(
P (x)− u(x)
)
− c+
(
λ1{u(x)>0} − µ(x)
)
u′(x). (6)
Remark 31 Let us remark that equation (6) corresponds to a trivial shared
risk Mean Field Game monotone system with N = 1, as described in the
previous section. Note that in the framework of this model, the mean field
aspect does not come from the continuum of agents (for every instant, the
number of players is finite), but rather to the stochastic continuous structure
of entries and exits of players.
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Now we look at the case where the stylized limit orderbook presented here
has an infinite resiliency, meaning once the orderbook is partially consumed
by a marketable order, the remaining liquidity rearranges itself to fill the gap.
Moreover, we will consider the non degenerated case where sellers arrive at
rate λ, larger than the exogenous consuming rate µ(x), for all x.
An example with anticipatory behavior. Assume the arrival rate of buyers has
the specificity to take two values:
– a low value µ1 below a certain queue size threshold S,
– a higher value µ2 ( µ2 > µ1), above the threshold S.
As a function depending upon the queue size variable x, it reads:
µ(x) = µ11x<S + µ21x≥S , 0 ≤ µ1 < µ2.
Here there are at least two points where u changes sign:
x∗1 = µ1P (x
∗
1)/c and x
∗
2 = µ2P (x
∗
2)/c. (7)
Figure 1 shows the plot of the solution (numerical approximation of the solu-
tion to equation (5)) for a certain set of parameters (for P constant). We can
see that the first switching point is close to the first order approximation x∗1,
while the last sign switch significantly deviates from the first order approxi-
mation x∗2. It means that higher order terms have a non-negligible effect.
But most importantly, we observe that there is another sign switch strictly be-
low the threshold S. The existence of such a switching point means that players
anticipate the improved service before the threshold is reached. Indeed, their
value function becomes positive meaning that players enter the queue strictly
before the improved service starts. This is why we talk about an anticipation
switching point. Consequently, we can conclude that at the equilibrium, the
strategical players adopt an anticipatory behavior.
First In First Out model. Finally we want to show that our approach allows
to model distinct execution processes, and how the resulting equilibrium equa-
tions are impacted.
To do so, we consider the First In First Out (FIFO) protocol. This is the only
change we make in the model. To consider such a priority protocol, we have
to introduce a new variable z denoting the position of a trader in the queue
of size x. Consequently the problem becomes bi-dimensional.
The equation becomes:
u(z, x) = (1− λ1u(x,x)>0dt− µ(x)dt) · u(z, x) ← nothing happens (8)
+ λ1{u(x,x)>0}dt · u(z, x+ q) ← new queue entrance
+ µ(x)dt · u(z − q, x− q) ← execution of the first order
− cqdt ← waiting cost,
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Fig. 1 Here we notice that there is a point strictly before S where u switches from negative
to positive. It means that players anticipate improved service µ2 and therefore are newly
interested in entering the queue.
in the domain q < z < x, and the boundary condition for z = q is:
u(q, x) = (1− λ1u(x,x)>0dt− µ(x)dt) · u(q, x) ← nothing happens (9)
+ λ1{u(x,x)>0}dt · u(q, x+ q) ← new queue entrance
+ µ(x)dt · P (x) ← execution of the first order
− cqdt ← waiting cost.
System (8-9) can be easily solved numerically.
3.2 The orderbook model
The matching mechanisms of order books. One of the roles of financial mar-
kets is to form prices according to the balance between offer and demand.
In modern markets, this mechanism takes place inside electronic order books
where multilateral trading takes place. They implement the following dynamic:
1. buyers and sellers can send electronic messages to a “matching engine”.
These messages, called orders, contain a side (“buy” or “sell”), a limit price
and a quantity.
2. The matching engine contains a list of all pending orders it received in its
memory. When it receives a new buy (respectively sell) order, it looks if
pending sell (resp. buy) orders at a lower (resp. higher) price are available.
– If it is the case, it generates transactions between the owner of the
incoming order and the owners of the compatible opposite orders, and
removes the corresponding quantities in its list of pending orders;
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– if the incoming order has a remaining quantity, it is inserted in the list
of pending orders.
The list of pending orders waiting in the matching engine is called its “limit
order book” (LOB).
During the matching process, it is possible that the quantity of an in-
coming order does not match exactly the quantity made available at a com-
patible price (i.e. lower prices for a buy order and higher prices for a sell
order) by opposite orders in the order book. To handle such cases, match-
ing engines need to implement a priority mechanism. The most used (see
[Mendelson and Amihud, 1991] for more details) are:
– time priority : the “oldest” pending orders in the order book are matched
first;
– size priority : the largest pending orders are matched first in case of com-
petition between resting orders at the same price;
– pro rata: pending orders are matched for a fraction of their quantity propor-
tionally to their relative size to the one of the whole queue (see [Field and Large, 2008]).
Each trading platform discloses its matching mechanism in detail to market
participants in a rulebook (like [Euronext, 2006]).
Matching dynamics and trading styles. Market participants thus have to cope
with rules of the matching engine they trade into while fulfilling their day-
to-day goals. Recent regulatory discussions raised questions on the potential
negative interactions between the following classes of market participants in
the same order book:
– Institutional investors, that buy and sell large quantities of shares to man-
age their portfolios on the long term. They take the decision to buy or sell
independently from the immediate state of the order book. They are in
essence impatient since they interact with other participants in the order
book with the final goal to really buy or sell given quantities before a given
deadline. They will not change their mind during the trading process given
the state of the liquidity in the order book.
– High Frequency Traders are far more opportunistic. Even if they do not
have all the same behavior (see [Brogaard et al., 2012] for more details),
they have in common the fact that: (1) they send very small orders to
trading platforms, (2) they do it very often (i.e. at high frequency), (3)
they have no other reason to trade than the immediate state of the order
book.
Concerns raised focused on the integrity of the price dynamics when so dif-
ferent participants are mixed in order books. The “Flash Crash” [Kirilenko et al., 2010]
has shown that liquidity glitches could cause large variations of prices formed
in electronic order books with no fundamental reasons. Academics studying
the price formation process in order books usually name “temporary mar-
ket impact” the way prices temporally deviate from their stable value due to
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high consumption of liquidity (i.e. of pending orders) in an order book (see
[Almgren et al., 2005], [Gatheral, 2010]).
Recent regulatory changes unexpectedly favored HFTs activity [Lehalle et al., 2013]
(they are said to now be part of 70% of transactions in the US, 40% in Europe
and 30% in some Asian markets, like Japan).
Dedicating a model to study liquidity games in order books. The way market
participants interact in order books is sophisticated, due to the fact that they
continuously try to anticipate actions of other participants to take an adequate
decision. Their classical dilemna is the following. On the one hand they want
to trade as slow as possible to avoid to be detected nor consume liquidity too
fast thus moving the price an unfavorable way (i.e. adverse selection costs).
On the other hand they cannot afford to trade too slow to avoid to be exposed
to adverse market moves (i.e. opportunity costs).
A large literature proposes mathematical frameworks for market partic-
ipant to optimize their trading kinematics: first mean-variances approaches
[Almgren and Chriss, 2000], then stochastic control ones [Bouchard et al., 2011],
and more recently stochastic algorithms have been designed to capture op-
timally liquidity at the smallest time scale [Page`s et al., 2011]. In all these
approaches, each market participant tries to optimize her behavior assuming
that the aggregation of other players is “martingale” in the sense that it is
submitted to price moves and to some order books characteristics (like the
volatility, the market depth, the intensity of orders reaching the matching en-
gine, etc.) emerging from the activity of other participants without influencing
it (in most cases a market impact function is introduced, exogenously from the
activity of other participants).
The MFG approach presented here takes into account the way strategies
of market participants change the dynamics of the order book. It opens the
door to more endogenous models. The previous section is a simple illustration
of this approach: the mean field is the state of the one-sided order book, and
since each player implements an optimal strategy (in the sense that she values
the time to wait in the queue and compares it to an immediate price to pay),
it is possible to understand the dynamics of the value function u shared by all
market participants.
In this section we will go one step further: the consuming rate µ(x) of the
one-sided order book (say it is the queue of sellers) of section 3.1 will be linked
to the size of the queue x, but in an endogenous way: that is via optimal
strategies followed by participants in the other queue (the one of buyers). The
flow consuming the selling queue is the one of buyers deciding on their side
to pay immediately instead of waiting in the queue (of buyers). It will enable
the emergence of coupled dynamics taking into account the states of the two
queues.
To render a market impact effect, we will model the way impatient buy or
sell orders consume the queue of sellers or buyers. For the ease of presentation,
in this paper we will consider that at our time scale the “fair price” (that
can be understood as a latent price like in [Robert and Rosenbaum, 2011] or
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[Bacry et al., 2012], or as a fundamental price like in [Ho and Stoll, 1983]) does
not change significantly. But the reader can note that extending this model
pegging a diffusive behavior on this fair price will do no more than adding an
Ito term to the considered dynamics. Mean Field-inspired models at a largest
time scale, targeting the understanding of the latent price dynamics have been
already proposed, but not at the level of the order books (for instance in
[Lehalle et al., 2010], the dynamics of a latent order book is submitted to an
MFG like mechanism, but the realizations of the order book is modeled via a
forward only scheme).
Hence, we introduce here a market-impact like relation between the size
of the order book queues and the transaction prices around the fair price
P : consuming a quantity q of the queue of pending selling orders of size Qa
will temporally move the price from P to P + δ · q/(Qa − q). Qualitatively, it
implies an almost linear market impact with elasticity δ (i.e. δ can be compared
to Kyle’s lambda [Kyle, 1985]). Moreover, the modelled orderbook will have
an infinite resiliency : once liquidity is consumed in a queue, the remaining
quantity will reshape itself to fill the created gap.
The details of the MFG model are exposed in the following sections. In
short, it contains these following ingredients:
– market participants are able to act strategically, anticipating others’ moves;
– the dynamics of the two queues (patient buyers and patient sellers) are
coupled thanks to the fact that the flow consuming each of them is provided
by agents of the other side choosing to be impatient (either because they
do not use a smart routing strategy, or because the outcome of their smart
strategy is to send a market order);
– market impact is introduced dynamically (related to the size of the queues),
modifying the premium to be paid by impatient traders, thus influencing
their choices.
Moreover, our order book model needs a priority rule, for simplicity reasons
we will use a pro-rata rule (since it keeps the dimensionality of the model
tractable). As it will be seen later, it allows to render enough complexity to
obtain meaningful results.
Rendering different trading styles in an order book model. To understand the
features of our MFG model, we will first study its dynamics in a market with
homogenous participants. Since we are in a MFG framework, it will render a
continuum of agents, at this stage they share the same macroscopic parame-
ters:
– the same messaging intensity λ,
– the same size of orders they send q,
– the same waiting cost c.
Beside, we enrich the model with one more feature: the use of SOR (Smart
Order Router). A Smart Order Router (see [Foucault and Menkveld, 2008]
for an efficiency study or [Lehalle et al., 2013] for a generic presentation) is
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a device containing a software dedicated to “smartly route” orders. In our
model, only SOR users will be able to act strategically instead of being blindly
impatient.
It can be considered that agents not using a SOR have an infinite waiting
cost. Since institutional investors take decisions independently of the current
state of the orderbook, it is realistic to consider that a fraction of them will
not take time to implement sophisticated microscopic strategies on some of
their orders.
The proportion of market participants using a SOR (i.e. not infinitely im-
patient market participants) will be parametrized thanks to a specific flow of
intensity λ−.
Instit. Investors HFT
Order size large small
Speed normal fast
SOR often used always used
Table 1 Qualitative modeling of Institutional Investors and HFT.
In a second stage we will mix heterogenous agents, with different behaviours
summarized in Table 1:
1. Institutional investors, trading large quantities not using systematically a
SOR;
2. HFT (High Frequency Traders), faster than the former participants, using
smaller orders, more patient (in the sense that they bare a lower cost per
share waiting in a queue), and all of them using a SOR.
Transaction price. The market price will be centered on a constant P . The
market depth is δ, meaning that no transaction will take place at a price lower
than P − δ or higher than P + δ. The (time varying) size of the bid queue
(waiting buy orders) is Qbt and the size of the ask one (waiting sell orders) is
Qat .
When a market (buying) order hits the ask queue, the transaction price is
pbuy and when the bid queue is lifted by a market (selling) order, the trans-
action price is psell. The price takes into account instantaneous queue size
adjustments depending upon the order size q.
pbuyq (Q
a
t ) := P +
δq
Qat − q
, psellq (Q
b
t) := P −
δq
Qbt − q
(10)
Qualitatively, it means that the market impact is linear. Boundary conditions,
to be introduced later, impose Qat , Q
b
t > q, so that there is no definition prob-
lem of the transaction prices
16 A Lachapelle, JM Lasry, CA Lehalle, PL Lions
Value functions. The value function for a trader submitting a buy order in the
bid queue is v(Qat , Q
b
t) and the one of a sell order in the ask queue is u(Q
a
t , Q
b
t).
In the model agents have risk-neutral preferences, thus the utility functions
coincide with price expectations.
Orders arrival rates. We distinguish between SOR and non-SOR orders. The
proportion of these two types of orders is exogenous, and set as an input of
the model.
Buy and sell SOR orders arrive according to two Poisson processes with in-
tensity λbuy and λsell. Several cases can be considered:
1. Homogeneous Poisson processes:
λbuy = λsell = λ. (11)
2. Heterogeneous (in space) Poisson processes
λbuy = λf(Q
b
t), λsell = λf(Q
a
t ),
where f(x) is a decreasing function. Typical instances are f(x) = 1/x,
f(x) = 1x≤Q¯ likewise.
However, we will focus in this paper on the homogenous case.
Let us remark that the previous rates could be endogenized and set as the
result of an optimization problem involving the utility functions, consequently
depending upon the queue sizes Q•t .
Non-SOR orders (i.e. belonging to very impatient investors or traders) are
always liquidity remover, with arriving rate 2λ− (equally distributed between
buyers and sellers).
Market participants decision processes. When a buy (resp. sell) order arrives,
its owner has to make a routing decision (see Figure 2 for an idealized diagram
of this process):
– if v(Qat , Q
b
t + q) < p
buy(Qat ) (resp. u(Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) > p
sell(Qbt)) it is more
valuable to route the order to the bid (resp. ask) queue (i.e. sending a
limit order). In such a case the order will be a Liquidity Provider (LP).
We define symmetrically Liquidity Consumer (LC) orders. This decision is
formalized in the model by setting the variable R⊕buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) to 1
when v(Qat , Q
b
t + q) < p
buy(Qat ), and to zero otherwise:
R⊕buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) := 1v(Qat ,Qbt+q)<pbuy(Qat ), LP buy order
R⊕sell(u,Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) := 1u(Qat +q,Qbt)>psell(Qbt), LP sell order.
(12)
Efficiency of the Price Formation Processs: a Mean Field Game Analysis 17
Fig. 2 Idealized diagram of the decision tree of agents in the model.
– otherwise the order goes Liquidity Consumerly to the ask (resp. bid) queue
to obtain a trade. It will be a liquidity remover in this case:
R	buy(Q
a
t, Q
b
t) := 1−R⊕buy(Qat, Qbt), LC buy order
R	sell(Q
a
t, Q
b
t) := 1−R⊕sell(Qat, Qbt), LC sell order.
The price of such a transaction is pbuy (resp. psell) as defined by equality
(10). Note that we omit the dependence on u, v when it is unnecessary for
the understanding of the equations.
We impose the following boundary conditions:
Min liquidity condition : R⊕buy(r,Q
b
t) = 1, R
⊕
sell(Q
a
t , r) = 1, ∀r ≤ q,
Technical condition : R⊕buy(Q
a
t , r) = 1, R
⊕
sell(r,Q
b
t) = 1, ∀r < q.
(13)
In particular, conditions (13) ensure that (Qa0 , Q
b
0) ≥ (q, q) ⇒ (Qat , Qbt) ≥
(q, q), ∀t > 0.
A MFG formalization: 1. The Control. Like in Section 3.1, we will adopt a
more standard MFG formalism. First of all note the identity of an agent i has
a one-to-one correspondance with the sum of the two Poisson processes Nλsell
and Nλbuy containing all the arrivals arrivals. When at time t a ith agent enters
the game, it can be a selling agent (in this case dNλsellt = 1) or a buying agent
(in this case dN
λbuy
t = 1); in any case i := N
λsell
t +N
λbuy
t .
A selling agent i can control its cost setting R⊕sell = 1 (in such a case he
will stay in the queue) or R⊕sell = 0 (in such a case he will consume the other
queue). For a buying agent, the control is R⊕buy.
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The decision is taken to minimize his cost function:
– on the one hand the selling agent knows the immediate price if he consumes
liquidity on the bid queue (it is psellq (Q
b
t), defined by equality (10));
– on the other hand, by construction the expected value to wait in the queue
is ui(Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t).
Like in the one queue toy model (equation (2)), his optimal control is hence
chosen to maximize the selling price:
R⊕sell,i := arg maxδ
δ · ui(Qat + q,Qbt) + (1− δ) · psellq (Qbt).
A MFG formalization: 2. Definition of the cost function. The dynamics asso-
ciated with this matching mechanism can be written:
– for the size of the ask queue Qat (it is equivalent to equation (3) of the one
queue toy model):
dQat =
(
dNλsellRsell
⊕
,i − (dNλbuyRbuy	,i′ + dNλ
−
)
)
q, (14)
where i is the identity of the selling agent taking a decision at t (i.e. i :=
Nλsellt ) and i
′ is the identity of the buying agent taking a decision at t (i.e.
i′ := Nλbuyt ).
– and for the running cost function at the ask (similarly to equation (4) of
the one queue toy model):
dJui (Q
a, Qb) =
[
q
Qa
pbuy(Qa) +
(
1− q
Qa
)
Jui (Q
a − q,Qb)
]
(15)
·(dNλbuyRbuy	,i′ + dNλ
−
)− caq dt.
The index i′ underlines the agents interacting with the cost function associ-
ated to wait on the ask side are the buying ones, and the index i underlines
the agents taking decision using this cost function to choose their control
are sellers.
Again, with T large enough, ui(Qa,Qb) = E
∫ T
t=0
Jui (Q
a
t , Q
b
t) dt given Q
a
0 =
Qq, Qb0 = Qb.
A MFG formalization: 3. Expression of the mean field. In this case the mean
field is two dimensional. It it made of the sizes of the two queues (Qat , Q
b
t).
One can note the identity of the agents i and i′ has no importance in equations
(14) and (19), all the dynamics are summarized by (Qat , Q
b
t).
Thanks to this remark we can write the forward dynamics of the mean
field {
dQat /q = dN
λsellRsell
⊕ − (dNλbuyRbuy	 + dNλ−)
dQbt/q = dN
λbuyRbuy
⊕ − (dNλsellRsell	 + dNλ−)
(16)
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in which we can plug the solution of the optimal control choices{
R⊕sell = arg maxδ δ · u(Qat + q,Qbt) + (1− δ) · psellq (Qbt)
R⊕buy = arg maxδ δ · v(Qat + q,Qbt) + (1− δ) · pbuyq (Qat )
. (17)
Again, thanks to the mean field the indices i and i′ are no more needed.
To be able to make the optimal choice, the agents have to solve the dynamics
of the value function{
u(Qa,Qb) = E ∫ T
t=0
Ju(Qat , Q
b
t) dt
v(Qa,Qb) = E ∫ T
t=0
Jv(Qat , Q
b
t) dt
, (18)
where Ju and Jv are now defined without any reference to the identity of the
agent i or i′; definition (15) now becomes:
dJu(Qa, Qb) =
[
q
Qa
pbuy(Qa) +
(
1− q
Qa
)
Ju(Qa − q,Qb)
]
(19)
·(dNλbuyRbuy	 + dNλ−)− caq dt.
and dJv is naturally defined a similar way.
The last step of the mean field game formalisation for our MFG orderbook
is developed in the next section.
Remark about the matching process. Before this last step, note that the match-
ing process is close to a pro-rata one [Field and Large, 2008]: in case of a liq-
uidity consuming buy order of size Q to be matched, all market participants
having a quantity q resting in the ask queue will obtain a transaction for a
fraction Q ·q/Qat of its order at price pbuy(Qat ), the remaining quantity staying
in the orderbook.
At a first glance one may think that this matching process will induce intricate
terms in the equations, but in fact it will not since we only consider utilities
by units of good transactions.
– The orderbook shape is assumed to be linear (in the price), meaning that if
a newcomer decide to provide liquidity to the market, her order will be split
proportionally to the liquidity already present in the book: the orderbook
will remain linear in price with a higher slope.
– Hence when a Liquidity Consumer order occurs, it will partially fill all
Liquidity Provider orders according to a proportional rule.
4 The PFP (Price Formation Process) dynamics
4.1 Stationary equilibrium as a fixed point of the value function: introducing
the equations
The fourth step of the MFG formalisation of our mean field game orderbook
allows us to characterize an equilibrium via recursive equations of the expected
value of future payoffs (value functions).
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u(Qat , Q
b
t) = (20)
(1− λbuydt− λselldt− 2λ−dt) u(Qat , Qbt) ← nothing
+ (λsellR
	
sell(u,Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) + λ
−)dt u(Qat , Q
b
t − q) ← sell order, LC
+ λsellR
⊕
sell(u,Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t)dt u(Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) ← sell order, LP
+ (λbuyR
	
buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) + λ
−)dt · [ ← buy order, LC
q
Qat
pbuy(Qat )︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade part (ask)
+ (1− q
Qat
)u(Qat − q,Qbt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
removing (ask)
]
+ λbuy R
⊕
buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q)dt u(Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) ← buy order, LP
− caq dt. ← cost to maintain inventory
Symmetrically, we have :
v(Qat , Q
b
t) = (21)
(1− λbuydt− λselldt− 2λ−dt) v(Qat , Qbt) ← nothing
+ (λbuyR
	
buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) + λ
−)dt v(Qat − q,Qbt) ← buy order, LC
+ λbuyR
⊕
buy(v,Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q)dt v(Q
a
t , Q
b
t + q) ← buy order, LP
+ (λsellR
	
sell(u,Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) + λ
−)dt · [ ← sell order, LC
q
Qbt
psell(Qbt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade part (bid)
+ (1− q
Qbt
) v(Qat , Q
b
t − q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
removing (bid)
]
+ λsellR
⊕
sell(u,Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t)dt v(Q
a
t + q,Q
b
t) ← sell order, LP
− cbq dt. ← cost to maintain inventory
Remind that Rbuy and Rsell are functionals of Q
a and Qb and also implicitly
depends on u and v. Of course the previous principles hold for Qat , Q
b
t > q,
which is always the case thanks to conditions (13). In the equations above,
ca and cb are positive constants modeling the cost to maintain inventory per
unit, that is the cost of never being processed once waiting in the queue.
4.2 Symmetric case
In the case where λsell = λbuy = λ, and ca = cb = c, we have the following
results.
For the sake of simplicity we will often use new notations for the queue size
variables: x and y stand for Qa and Qb.
Lemma 41
∀(x, y), R⊕sell(u, x, y) = R⊕buy(2P − v, y, x)
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This simple symmetry result is useful to get a necessary condition for the
solution.
Proposition 42 If system (20)-(21) has a unique solution (u, v), then
∀(x, y), u(x, y) + P = P − v(y, x).
That is, u and v are antisymmetric up to the constant P .
Proof Take Equation (20) then perform the change of variable w(y, x) = 2P −
u(x, y), then apply the previous Lemma, switch the roles of x and y and
multiply by −1. Then you get equation (21), hence the conclusion.
4.3 Continuous approximation
In this paragraph we formally derive differential equations corresponding to
the PFP dynamic discrete equations (20-21) as presented in the previous sec-
tion. Hopefully, this will lead us to get easily some qualitative insights on the
solutions u and v.
To do so, we write the Taylor expansion of order 1 at the point (x, y) in sys-
tem (20-21). After a quick computation, we get the following system of Partial
Differential Equations (PDEs). Note that for the sake of simplicity we shorten
the notations as follows: sell becomes s, buy becomes b, Qa becomes x and Qb
becomes y.
(Ask) 0 = [(λbR
	
b + λ
−)
1
x
(pb(x)− u)− ca]
+ [λsR
⊕
s − λbR	b − λ−] · ∂xu+ [λbR⊕b − λsR	s − λ−] · ∂yu,
(Bid) 0 = [(λsR
	
s + λ
−)
1
y
(ps(y)− v) + cb]
+ [λsR
⊕
s − λbR	b − λ−] · ∂xv + [λbR⊕b − λsR	s − λ−] · ∂yv.
Recall that u, v,Rb, Rs are estimated at (x, y) and Rb depends upon v, resp.
Rs depends upon u. Consequently, Rb and Rs are the coupling terms in the
PDE system (Ask)-(Bid).
The system has to be understood locally in the four regions
R++= {(x, y), R⊕s (x, y) = R⊕b (x, y) = 1}, R−−= {(x, y), R	s (x, y) = R	b (x, y) = 1},
R+−= {(x, y), R⊕s (x, y) = R	b (x, y) = 1}, R−+= {(x, y), R	s (x, y) = R⊕b (x, y) = 1}.
Now we can write the general form of the first order system of coupled PDEs.
0 = γa(u, v, x, y) + α(u, v, x, y)∂xu+ β(u, v, x, y)∂yu (22)
0 = γb(u, v, x, y) + α(u, v, x, y)∂xv + β(u, v, x, y)∂yv, (23)
where γa, γb, α, β have some good symmetry properties to be described later
on.
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The MFG framework. The model is of course a Mean Field Game. As men-
tioned in section 2, there are continuous entries and exits of players (modeled
with Poisson processes). Therefore the basis assumptions are fulfilled: contin-
uum of atomized and anonymous players.
Comparing equations (22)-(23) and (1), it is easy to notice that the equilib-
rium equations have the same form as the monotone system characterizing
some MFG equilibria.
Second order terms. We kept only the first order terms in the equations. The
second order terms to be added to the equations are:
In (Ask)
q2
2
[
2
x
(λbR
	
b +λ
−)∂xu+λ−∆u+(λsR⊕s +λbR
	
b )∂xxu+(λsR
	
s +λbR
⊕
b )∂yyu
]
,
In (Bid)
q2
2
[
2
y
(λsR
	
s +λ
−)∂yv+λ−∆v +(λsR⊕s +λbR
	
b )∂xxv+(λsR
	
s +λbR
⊕
b )∂yyv
]
.
5 Equilibrium analysis
5.1 Change of variables
From now on we focus on the symmetric case where λs = λb = λ and ca =
cb = c. First it is convenient to notice that in this important case, we have the
following property:
α = β = [λ(R⊕s (u, x, y)−R	b (v, x, y))− λ−].
We will see later that this property allows to solve the problem thanks to the
characteristics method.
There is a very welcome change of variables that we will use throughout this
section. We define
u˜ = (u− P )/q and v˜ = (v − P )/q. (24)
Then the (Ask)-(Bid) system reads
0 = [(λR˜	b + λ
−)
1
x
(
δ
x− q − u˜)−
c
q
] + [λR˜⊕s − λR˜	b − λ−] · (∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜),
0 = [(λR˜	s + λ
−)
1
y
(
−δ
y − q − v˜) +
c
q
] + [λR˜⊕s − λR˜	b − λ−] · (∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜).
(25)
Proposition 51 Assume that system (25) admits a unique solution (u˜, v˜),
then it is antisymmetric, that is:
∀(x, y), v˜(x, y) = −u˜(y, x).
The general form of the system (25) is as follows:
0 = γ(u˜, v˜, x, y) + α(u˜, v˜, x, y)(∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜) (26)
0 =−γ(v˜, u˜, y, x) + α(u˜, v˜, x, y)(∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜). (27)
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5.2 First Order Analysis
Here we explore formally some aspects of the first order approximation to the
solution.
The key point of the analysis is that in the two equations of system (25), the
derivative terms are the same, so that we conclude that the characteristics
satisfy
x˙ = y˙ = α⇒ x = y + k.
Note that the reasoning of this paragraph holds on the region below the diag-
onal, but can be trivially extended to the whole domain by symmetry argu-
ments.
We heuristically suppose that for a given k, and along the characteristic line
y = x − k, there is a first point M0 = (x0, y0) where the sellers become Liq-
uidity Consumer, that is M0 is a point at the boundary of the regions R
++
and R−+.
Then there is a second point M1 = (x1, y1), with x1 ≥ x0 and y1 ≥ y0 where
the buyers become Liquidity Consumer, that is M1 is a point at the boundary
of the regions R−+ and R−−.
First recall that:
R++ is defined by R⊕s = 1 and R
⊕
b = 1,
R−+ is defined by R⊕s = 0 and R
⊕
b = 1,
R−− is defined by R⊕s = 0 and R
⊕
b = 0.
We can write the differential equations on the three regions mentioned above:
(AR++) 0 =
[λ−
x
(
δ
x− q − u˜)−
c
q
]
+ [λ− λ−] · (∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜),
(BR++) 0 =
[λ−
y
(
−δ
y − q − v˜) +
c
q
]
+ [λ− λ−] · (∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜),
(AR−+) 0 =
[λ−
x
(
δ
x− q − u˜)−
c
q
]
+ [−λ−] · (∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜),
(BR−+) 0 =
[λ+ λ−
y
(
−δ
y − q − v˜) +
c
q
]
+ [−λ−] · (∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜),
(AR−−) 0 =
[λ+ λ−
x
(
δ
x− q − u˜)−
c
q
]
+ [−λ− λ−] · (∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜),
(BR−−) 0 =
[λ+ λ−
y
(
−δ
y − q − v˜) +
c
q
]
+ [−λ− λ−] · (∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜).
(28)
The equations are relatively simple in each region. The tricky point is, as
always, to stick together the solutions of each region. First we compute the
boundaries of the regions.
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First order boundaries. Let’s note M0 the first order boundary between R
++
and R−+ and M1 between R−+ and R−−.
Proposition 52 (First order boundary between R++ and R−+) The di-
agonal point of the boundary M0 is the point
(x∗0, x
∗
0) = (q +
√
q2 + 8/η)/2 (29)
and the boundary M0 is given by the set of points (x0, y0) verifying:
(x0, y0) =
(
x0, l(x0) := q +
(
ηx0 − 1
x0 − q
)−1)
, ∀x0 ≥ x∗0, (30)
where η := c/(δqλ−).
Proposition 53 (First order boundary between R−+ and R−−) The bound-
ary M1 is defined by the set of points (y1 + x0 − l(x0), y1), ∀x0 ≥ x∗0, where
y1 verifies fx0−l(x0)(y1) =
δ
y1 + x0 − l(x0)− q . (31)
See Sections A.1 and A.2 in Appendix for the proofs.
Figure 3 exhibits an instance of the first order curves. We observe that near
the diagonal, there is a region where several solutions could happen. The first
order analysis thus shows the global form of the shape of the solution (since
it is based on the curves M0, M1), and that considering higher order terms is
necessary to understand what happens in the region near the diagonal.
Fig. 3 First order decision curves
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5.3 Second Order Equations
According to section 4.3, the general form of the second order equations is:
0 = γ(u˜, v˜, x, y) + α(u˜, v˜, x, y)(∂xu˜+ ∂yu˜)
+ q
(
ρ(v˜, x, y))∂xu˜+ ξ1(u˜, v˜, x, y)∂xxu˜+ ξ2(u˜, v˜, x, y)∂yyu˜
)
,
0 =−γ(v˜, u˜, y, x) + α(u˜, v˜, x, y)(∂xv˜ + ∂y v˜)+
+ q
(
ρ(u˜, y, x))∂y v˜ + ξ1(u˜, v˜, x, y)∂xxv˜ + ξ2(u˜, v˜, x, y)∂yy v˜
)
,
(32)
where:
ρ = 1x (λR
	
b +λ
−), ξ1 = (λ(R⊕s +R
	
b ) +λ
−)/2, and ξ2 = (λ(R	s +R
⊕
b ) +λ
−)/2.
See Section A.3 in Appendix for the local equations on the same four regions.
In the next part, we provide several example of markets based on the model.
6 Applications
This section is dedicated to applications of the MFG model to study the out-
come of a combination of different trading behaviors in the same order book.
The purpose here is not to study how the price discovery operates on the
long term, but how microstructure effects can deviate transaction prices from
the fair price. This model will thus explain how the state of the liquidity
can change the dynamics of the price while forming an equilibrium price.
This equilibrium can potentially deviate from the latent (or fair) price. The
main drivers of these modifications will be the behavior of trading agents, and
specifically the average size of their orders, their speed, their waiting cost,
and how often they use optimized strategies (see Table 1 for a qualitative
description of the main parameters of their strategies).
In this section, we will investigate theoretically and using simulations the
reasons why the price deviates or not from the “fair price” (exogenously fixed).
The variables of interest are:
– the asymptotic state of the liquidity offer (i.e. the size of the bid queue and
ask queue): are they large or small? are they balanced?
– The average transaction price: how far away it is from the fair price?
– The average value of the bid-ask spread; in which conditions is it high or
low?
Having in mind that each time an agent buys or sells she suffers from market
impact, i.e. consuming liquidity implies paying enough to find counterparts
(this premium decreases with the size of the consumed queue), the strategy of
each market participant affects her price. We will thus be able to compute an
average price for each class of market participants, answering the question: do
the institutional investors pay more than high frequency traders?
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It will also allow us to compute an effective bid-ask spread being twice the
difference between the mid price and the transaction price; it will not be the
same for each market participant.
Definition 61 (Effective bid-ask spread) The effective bid ask spread of
an agent A is the expected transaction price of its liquidity removing buying
orders minus the one of its liquidity removing selling orders:
ψe(A) := δ · E
(
q
Qat
∣∣∣∣R	buy(A))+ δ · E( qQbt
∣∣∣∣R	sell(A)) . (33)
The effective spread is higher for an impatient agent if the spread is larger
when she consumes liquidity than when she provides liquidity.
Another important tool is the invariant measure describing the repartition
of the agents in the (liquidity) state space, being the probability of having the
system in a specific region of the state space. Our state space is captured by
the sizes of the two queues (the bid queue and the ask queue).
Thanks to the results obtained in the previous sections, we will be able not
only to observe discrepancies between agents’ behaviour and their outcome,
but also to explain and understand them in details.
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 Test 6
qii 1 0.25 1 1 1 1
λii 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.6
λ−ii 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
cii · qii 2.5·10−3 2.5·10−3 10−2 2.5·10−3 2.5·10−3 2.5·10−3
qHFT - - - - 0.25 0.25
λHFT - - - - 4 3.6
λ−HFT - - - - 0 0.4
cHFT · qHFT - - - - 10−2 10−2
Table 2 Parameters defining the studied models.
A first subsection is dedicated to applications with models including one class
of agents only, to understand and explain in details the mechanisms that our
MFG model can render. In a second subsection we will use an heterogenous
agent model, allowing to understand the result of putting together more than
one class of market participants. Here we mix Institutional Investors and High
Frequency Traders. Section 6.2.1 presents a theoretical expansion of Section 3.2
needed to handle more than one agent class. Table 2 summarizes the different
models and their parameters.
6.1 Markets with Institutional Investors only
6.1.1 Modeling Institutional Investors
Since we just want to model one class of market participants, their specification
is not very important. It will become crucial when we mix different types of
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agents: the relative speed, the relative sizes of orders, etc., will play a role of
paramount importance in the multi-agent simulations.
With one type of investors only we mainly focus on using realistic val-
ues and exploring the sensitivities of the emerging dynamics to the values of
the parameters. Note first that some parameters define the framework of the
simulation and not the market participants themselves:
– we have seen this in the change of variable (24) that the fair price P has
no impact on the dynamics, it is taken as a constant,
– the market depth δ, playing a role in the expression of the market impact of
one trade (at the first order it is homogenous to Kyle’s lambda). Looking
carefully at the market impact expression (10), it can be read that δ is
homogenous to the inverse of a quantity: dividing δ by two and multiplying
quantities by two will not change the dynamics but relatively increase the
waiting costs (that are proportional to the order size q).
Other parameters are directly associated with the agent:
– the size of her orders q,
– the intensity λ of the Poisson process governing the arrival rate of smart
routed orders;
– the intensity λ− of the Poisson process governing the arrival of not smart
routed orders (i.e. blindly sending market orders or having infinite waiting
costs);
– the cost of waiting per share c: waiting dt seconds is worth cq dt.
Some simple statistics on equity markets can give reasonable figures for these
parameters (see [Lehalle et al., 2013] for more details about evolution of trad-
ing behaviours from 2007 to 2013):
– the intensity Λ = λ+λ− can be roughly estimated by the average number
of trades per time unit ;
– the size q has no unit (it will have a role when compared to the size of
HFT orders); for the sake of simplicity we will take it equals to one. For
information the table gives the average trade size and the average size at
first limit.
6.1.2 Simulations and results
First we consider the case of a single group of traders all with the same order
size q. The elementary algorithm we use to compute the equilibrium is as
follow:
1. Initialize u0 and v0 (e.g. to the constant function equal to P )
2. Step k:
compute uk the solution to equation (20) using the inputs uk−1 and vk−1,
compute vk the solution to equation (21) using the inputs uk and vk−1.
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Equilibrium as an invariant measure. Equilibrium visualization is made of the
level sets of the stationary measure of queue sizes. The previous measure is
computed from the transition probability depending upon u and v.
More precisely, the transition process at a certain state (Qa, Qb):
(Qa, Qb) → (Qa, Qb) with probability 1− 2λdt− 2λ−dt
(Qa, Qb) → (Qa + q,Qb) with probability λR⊕s dt
(Qa, Qb)→ (Qa − q,Qb) with probability λR	b dt+ λ−dt
(Qa, Qb)→ (Qa, Qb + q) with probability λR⊕b dt
(Qa, Qb)→ (Qa, Qb − q) with probability λR	s dt+ λ−dt,
where we use the probability of occurrence of events as described in equations
(20) and (21).
The resulting process has of course the Markov property.
Test 1: institutional traders with many SOR arrivals (i.e. very few impatient
traders). The first numerical test corresponds to the following set of parame-
ters: q = 1, δ = 2, c = 2, 5× 10−3, λ = 1, and λ− = 0.2.
We show the results in Figure 4. We observe that the decision regions
R++, R−+, R+−, and R−− have the expected form. We also remark that the
second order term selects a particular solution amongst all order one solutions.
Mathematically, this has to be linked to the notion of viscosity solutions, but
we do not enter in the details here [Crandall et al., 1992].
Below the diagonal, that is for values of Qb smaller than Qa, the region
where both sellers and buyers are Liquidity Provider corresponds to small
Qa and Qb, then the sellers turn to be Liquidity Consumer while the buyers
remain liquidity adders, and finally they also turn to be Liquidity Consumer.
The invariant measure is almost concentrated on the points where both sell-
ers and buyers turn to be Liquidity Consumer, i.e. it is concentrated on the
boundary curve M0 describing the frontier between R
++ and R−+& R+−.
From now on, we refer to this curve as the P→C switching curve for Provider
to Consumer switching curve. We symmetrically define the C→P switching
curve as the frontier between R+− & R−+ and R−−.
However, the most remarkable point is that the invariant measure shows
two bumps, located in the cavities of the P→C switching curve. In the new
reference frame after a pi/4 axis rotation, the cavities corresponds to the global
minimum points of the P→C switching curve.
Here the economic intuition is that there are two symmetric liquidity pools,
one on the buy side, where only buy orders are completed, and conversely for
the sell side.
Figure 5 shows the form of the routing decision boundaries versus the first
order analytical curves derived earlier. It is noteworthy to observe that the
real switching curves tries to conciliate the curves analytically computed at
order 1. However, it approximates better the P→C switching curve than the
C→P switching curve.
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(a) Mapping of the decision regions
(b) Corresponding invariant measure
Fig. 4 Test 1: the numerical solution for a single homogeneous specie of traders. (a) The
routing decision regions have the expected form: for small queue sizes (in white) the buyers
and sellers act mostly as liquidity providers, for large queues (in dark) they both act as
liquidity consumers, in between (in grey) only one type of agent (buyers or sellers) consume
liquidity while the other provides liquidity (this last case correspond to liquidity imbalances).
(b) The invariant measure exhibits two symmetric cavities: (the white zones figure low
concentration of agents while the dark ones are for frequent stable points of the state space);
it reads that the liquidity imbalances ((a) grey zones) can be stable.
Several visualizations of system trajectories are possible. We display the time
evolution (for 600 instants) of various quantities in Figure 6. In this example
30 A Lachapelle, JM Lasry, CA Lehalle, PL Lions
Fig. 5 Test 1: the numerically computed switching curves (red and green dots) tries to
conciliate the curves analytically computed at order 1 (dotted and solid lines).
there are mainly two distinct regimes: from instant tini to tswitch = 330, the
activity is mainly concentrated on the ask queue. During the second period,
most of the activity holds on the bid side.
The coupled trajectory of queue sizes in the space Qa×Qb is another pos-
sible visualization. In the plot, dots are colored from yellow to red, according
to the number of time the queue system passes through the corresponding size
configuration. Here also we see the hange of regime at tswitch where the pro-
cess goes through the diagonal, jumping from the ask activity zone to the bid
activity one. One more time both liquidity configurations are visible. Above
the diagonal Qa = Qb, red dots are more likely to be horizontally distributed
(meaning that most of transactions hold on the ask side), and symmetrically
below the diagonal.
Both visualizations confirm the phenomenon that one could expect after
looking at the invariant measure plot.
Test 2: order size impact. Now we only change the value of q, and take it
smaller than in test 1: q = 0, 25. Figure 7 shows that the real C→P switching
curve is closer to the 1st order curve, which is natural since taking q smaller
means that the second order term impacts are shrunk (as expected comparing
equations 41 with equations 28).
Test 3: risk aversion impact. Figure 8 shows the impact of a bigger c on the
solution. We compare the results obtained for the set of parameters of Test 1
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Fig. 6 Here we show a particular simulation of the orderbook. We plot the evolution of
various quantities for 600 instants. A sample trajectory of coupled queue sizes is plotted.
Dots are colored from yellow (1 visit) to red (about 15 visits). Note that 3 milestones are
introduced. We observe a change of regime at instant tswitch where the market activity
switches from the ask queue to the bid queue.
with the results obtained for the same parameters except the value of the new
risk aversion 4× c = 10−2. We observe mainly two effects:
– queue sizes are shrunk (from about 30 to 10);
– the invariant measure maximum is now on the diagonal. Therefore, the two
antisymmetric liquidity pools progressively disappear.
Test 4: the case with half non-SOR (i.e. impatient) orders. Here we provide a
stationary equilibrium instance in a case where half of the order arrivals are
non-SOR. Figure 9 shows that at the equilibrium there are still two symmetric
regions of concentration at the neighborhood of the P→C switching curves.
In such a case we observe more density on low queue sizes.
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(a) The invariant measure has the same form, it is concentrated on smaller
values.
(b) The real PC switching curves is closer to the 1st order switching curve.
Fig. 7 Test 2 (smaller order size q): comparing the invariant measure (a) and the switching
curves (b) with the one of test 1 (Figure 4:b and Figure 5), we deduce the second order
terms impacts.
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(a) Test 1: c = 2.5× 10−3 (b) Test 3: ch = 10−2
Fig. 8 The two symmetric bumps vanish and a single bump appears on the diagonal
Fig. 9 Test 4: the case with half of very impatient (i.e. Non-SOR) orders.
6.1.3 Possible liquidity imbalance with one class of participant only
First remind that the type of a participant is described by the way she interacts
with order books. Hence a pension fund taking long term positions, a low
frequency statistical arbitrageur, and the hedging desk of an investment bank
will have the same type. The important elements being they all:
– take a decision before starting to interact with the order book,
– do not use a smart order router systematically (i.e. can be very impatient),
– trade with relatively large orders, even once their meta orders have been
split thanks to an optimal trading scheme (like in [Bouchard et al., 2011],[Almgren and Chriss, 2000],[Alfonsi et al., 2009]
or [Gue´ant et al., 2012]).
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The outcome of the application to one class of investors is that the market
can suffer for long and stable liquidity imbalances. We have seen that in such
typical cases the bid and ask queues are in an asymmetric configuration:
– one of the queues (the ask one, for instance) is significantly shorter than
the other,
– the flow of buyers considers that the price to pay to wait is too high and
accept to pay the market impact on a small queue,
– the flow of seller notices that they can obtain a fast trade being passive
(i.e. going into the bid queue), since 100% of the buyers are now impatient.
This leads to a stable state of the order book: the invariant measure sees two
symmetrical concentrations of such configurations, dominating more balanced
states located in the diagonal (see Figure 4:b, 7:a and 9).
In such a situation, we can say that liquidity calls for liquidity : the conjunction
of a high rate of consuming orders at the smaller queue and of an high arrival
rate of liquidity on the same queue feeds an equilibrium.
During such a configuration the transaction price is significantly different from
the exogenous fair price. Since the model is stochastic its state will nevertheless
evolve to explore other configuration (see Figure 6 for a trajectory instance).
Nevertheless the form of the invariant measure indicates that the fraction of
time during which the model is in such inefficient configurations dominates.
When the behaviors of participants are so similar that they create liquidity
imbalances, it is often proposed to add a population of market makers (see
[Ho and Stoll, 1983]), hoping that it will break these “liquidity circles” and
bring back the invariant measure on the diagonal. One argues that high fre-
quency traders are a modern version of agents of this kind [Menkveld, 2010].
The goal of the next subsection is to study their influence on the invariant
measure inside our MFG modelling framework.
6.2 Introducing High Frequency Traders
6.2.1 Equations and quantities for two groups
The model is such that considering several types of traders is not a big deal.
This is good news since our aim is to get insights on the role of High Frequency
Traders in the scope of our model.
We therefore split the agents into two subsets:
– Institutional Investors, with a smaller intensity λ1, but with bigger sizes
q1 and risk aversion c1.
– HFTs, with a higher intensity λ2 and smaller sizes q2 and risk aversion c2,
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The two groups also differentiate by having specific λ−1 , λ
−
2 (i.e. impatient
flows). This leads to twice the value functions we had.
We also have to consider HFT’s routing decisionsR⊕buy(v2, x, y+q2) := 1v2(x,y+q)<pbuyq2 (x)
(symmetrically R⊕sell).
Now we write the equation of sellers’ value functions u1, u2. As before, buyers’
value function equations can be easily derived by simple symmetry arguments.
k · u1(x, y) =
(λ1R
	
sell(u1, x+ q1, y) + λ
−
1 )u1(x, y − q1) + λ1R⊕sell(u1, x+ q1, y)u1(x+ q1, y)
+ (λ1R
	
buy(v1, x, y + q1) + λ
−
1 )[
q1
x
pbuy1 (x) + (1−
q1
x
)u1(x− q1, y)]
+ (λ1R
⊕
buy(v1, x, y + q1)u1(x, y + q1)) + (λ2R
⊕
buy(v2, x, y + q2)u1(x, y + q2)
+ (λ2R
	
sell(u2, x+ q2, y) + λ
−
2 )u1(x, y − q2) + λ2R⊕sell(u2, x+ q2, y)u1(x+ q2, y)
+ (λ2R
	
buy(v2, x, y + q2) + λ
−
2 )[
q2
x
pbuy2 (x) + (1−
q2
x
)u1(x− q2, y)]
− c1q1),
(34)
k · u2(x, y) =
(λ1R
	
sell(u1, x+ q1, y) + λ
−
1 )u2(x, y − q1) + λ1R⊕sell(u1, x+ q1, y)u2(x+ q1, y)
+ (λ1R
	
buy(v1, x, y + q1) + λ
−
1 )[
q1
x
pbuy1 (x) + (1−
q1
x
)u2(x− q1, y)]
+ (λ1R
⊕
buy(v1, x, y + q1)u2(x, y + q1)) + (λ2R
⊕
buy(v2, x, y + q2)u2(x, y + q2))
+ (λ2R
	
sell(u2, x+ q2, y) + λ
−
2 )u2(x, y − q2) + λ2R⊕sell(u2, x+ q2, y)u2(x+ q2, y)
+ (λ2R
	
buy(v2, x, y + q2) + λ
−
2 )[
q2
x
pbuy2 (x) + (1−
q2
x
)u2(x− q2, y)]
− c2q2,
(35)
where k = 2(λ1 + λ2 + λ
−
1 + λ
−
2 ).
At this stage, it is important to remark that the only difference in equations
(34) and (35) is the term c1q1. As a consequence, u1 and u2 coincide as soon
as c1q1 = c2q2, which is the reference case we study in the present work.
We take c1q1 = c2q2 by purpose: thanks to this choice HFT will not have
an exogenous advantage coming from a lower waiting costs. They will have to
exploit their size and frequency specificities (they send more orders, of smaller
size).
Note that in this case, a first order solution can be explicitly calculated
using the methodology of the previous section.
In this section we will compare equilibria in terms of average transaction prices
and spread. Let us detail the way we define average prices. Before writing down
the average price equations, we need to introduce some notations. For the sake
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of simplicity we only work with sellers. Buyers notations and equations can be
easily derived by symmetry.
Empirical stationary measure: mˆ(Qa, Qb)
Type’s i stationary proportion: γˆi(Qa, Qb)
Fig. 10 There are nine regions in terms of trader type (HFTvs Institutional Investor) and
trader action (LP vs LC)
As previously, there are several regions defined by the LP or LC behavior of
traders. Figure 10 shows an instance with 9 regions. Two cases may happen,
depending upon the relative size of λ−i , λi, i = 1, 2. We do not want to enter the
(technical) details nor review all possible cases, but we would like to mention
that a necessary condition for the existence of several regions is that
∑
λi >∑
λ−i , that is there is globally more SOR than non-SOR traders in the system.
In the first case, Institutional Investors switch first from LP to LC. In the
second case, HFT switch first (which is the case in Figure 10). Note that the
proportion γˆi of traders of type i is constant in each region defined in Figure
10. Consequently we can define the marginal distribution of traders of type i
as:
mˆi(Qa, Qb) := γˆi(Qa, Qb)mˆ(Qa, Qb).
Now, in each region, there is a certain traded quantity ξ. In table 3 we provide
the corresponding values of ξ and γi.
The general formula of the average prices are:
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γi ξ
R1 :=(R++1 , R++2 ) λiλ1+λ2 (λ
−
1 q1/Qa, λ
−
2 q2/Qa)
R2 :=(R++1 , R−−2 ) 1i=1 (λ−1 q1/Qa, Λ2q2/Qa)
R3 :=(R−−1 , R−−2 ) 0 -
R4 :=(R++1 , R−+2 ) 1i=1 (λ−1 q1/Qa, λ−2 q2/Qa)
R5 :=(R−+1 , R+−2 ) 0 -
R6 :=(R−+1 , R−−2 ) 0 -
R7 :=(R++1 , R+−2 ) λiλ1+λ2 (λ
−
1 q1/Qa, Λ2q2/Qa)
R8 :=(R+−1 R+−2 ) λiλ1+λ2 (Λ1q1/Qa, Λ2q2/Qa)
R9 :=(R+−1 , R−−2 ) 1i=1 (Λ1q1/Qa, Λ2q2/Qa)
Table 3 Values of various quantities in each of the 9 regions
• Type’s i LC proportion:
M−s,i :=
∫
(Qa,Qb)∈R−+i
⋃
R−−i
Λiqidmˆ(Qa, Qb) +
∫
(Qa,Qb)∈R++i
⋃
R+−i
λ−i qidmˆ(Qa, Qb)
• Type’s i LP proportion:
M+s,i :=
9∑
i=1
∫
(Qa,Qb)∈Ri
〈ξ(Qa, Qb), (1, 1)〉 dmˆi(Qa, Qb)
• Type’s i price for Liquidity Consumer traders:
p¯−s,i :=
(∫
(Qa,Qb)∈R−+i
⋃
R−−i
Λiqip
sell
qi (Qb)dmˆ(Qa, Qb) +
∫
(Qa,Qb)∈R++i
⋃
R+−i
λ−i qip
sell
qi (Qb)dmˆ(Qa, Qb)
)
/M−s,i
• Type’s i price for Liquidity Provider traders:
p¯+s,i :=
( 9∑
i=1
∫
(Qa,Qb)∈Ri
〈ξ(Qa, Qb), (pbuyq1 (Qa), pbuyq2 (Qa))〉 dmˆi(Qa, Qb)
)
/M+s,i
Finally the average price for sellers can be simply deduced:
p¯s,i =
p¯−s,iM
−
s,i + p¯
+
s,iM
+
s,i
M−s,i +M
+
s,i
.
6.2.2 Numerical tests
Test 5. Our aim is to model a market opened to HFT, and to observe the
effects of the arrival of HFTs. To do so, we consider the following case:
– HFT order sizes are four times smaller than Institutional Investors orders.
– All HFT arbitrate between being Liquidity Providers or Liquidity Con-
sumers while half of Institutional Investors are Liquidity Consumers any-
way.
The selected parameters corresponding to such a market are:
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(a) Test 4: Institutional Investors only
(b) Test 5: Institutional Investors and HFT
Fig. 11 Comparison of invariant measures: effect of adding HFT (tests 3 and 5).
– General parameters : δ = 2, P = 100.
– Institutional Investors: Λ1 = λ1 + λ
−
1 =
1
2 +
1
2 , q1 = 1, c1 = 0.25%.
– HFT: Λ2 = λ2 + λ
−
2 = 4 + 0, q2 = 0.25, c2 = 1%
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(a) Test 1: Institutional Investors only
(b) Test 6: Institutional Investors and HFT
Fig. 12 Comparison of invariant measures:effect of having more impatient Institutional
Investors and more impatient HFT (tests 4 and 6).
Remind that we have chosen to set c1q1 = c2q2.
Another modeling assumption is that orders are equally split between both
types, that is Λ1 = Λ2.
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As in section 5.2, we can distinguish several cases depending upon the action
type of the traders. This lead to 9 distinct regions in the Qa×Qb space, which
are depicted in Figure 10. Note that the upper-index denotes the action (+
stands for Liquidity Provider, − for Liquidity Consumer) and the lower-index
denotes the type of trader.
We can compare the two following situations: the market stationary equi-
librium with a single specie of traders (Institutional Investors), and the market
after the arrival of HFTs.
Figure 11 shows the corresponding stationary measure of states (size of ask
and bid queues).
We notice that in the case with Institutional Investors only, there are sta-
ble liquidity imbalances with two symmetric configurations (one favorable to
buyers, and the other one to sellers). On the other hand, in the case with
both Institutional Investors & HFT, we observe a liquidity stabilization and
a concentration on a single balance equilibrium.
Recall that in the present case with c1q1 = c2q2, the value functions of Institu-
tional Investors and HFT coincide. Consequently the existence of nine regions
and the stabilizing effect described above are only explained by market impact
heterogeneity. Which is a noteworthy numerical result.
In Table 4 we display the numerical values of the average transaction prices
(only for sellers since the prices for buyers are symmetrical, the fair price being
100).
We remark that HFT trade at better prices than Institutional Investors and
that Institutional Investors average selling price decreases in the market with
HFT. Consequently, in this case HFT traders capture the difference, and even
more.
Test 4 Test 5
II only II in the mix HFT in the mix mix
Liquidity Consumers 99.849 99.842 99.938 99.89
Liquidity Providers 100.238 100.103 100.189 100.146
Average 99.876 99.852 99.981 99.916
Spread ψ 0.248 0.296 0.038 0.167
Spread ψ (bps) 25 30 4 17
Table 4 Expected transaction prices and spread in the model
The last row shows the impact on the spread. In the framework of our model we
define the expected bid-ask spread as the difference ψ = E(pbuy)−E(psell). We
conclude that the spread increase for Institutional Investors is 20%, while the
global spread decrease of the market is worth 33%. Consequently, the spread
reduction clearly profits to HFTs.
Our simulation results are compatible with spread shrinking scenarios in
which while reducing the spread, HFT provoke more impatience among other
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(slower) types of investors. The result of such a mixing is that fast agents, re-
ducing the spread, are more passive than other class of investors, or aggressive
when the spread is at their advantage.
Comparison with empirical data. [Gareche et al., 2013] uses real data to fit ob-
served order flows with coef of a Fokker-Planck like PDE, compatible with our
MFG approach. The Figure 9 of this empirical paper exhibits configurations
that are close to our theoretical stationary results.
Test 6. For the sake of completeness we end this section with another example,
for other proportions of SOR and non-SOR traders. Here we take the same
parameters as in Test 1 except that Λ1 = λ1 + λ
−
1 = 90%× 4 + 10%× 4 and
Λ2 = λ2 + λ
−
2 = 60% + 40%. Thus we look at a situation where there are
10 points more SOR in the Institutional Investor population and 10 points
less SOR amongst HFTs. In Figure 12 we compare the situation between a
market with Institutional Investors only and with a mix of both Institutional
Investors and HFTs.
Table 5 shows the corresponding quantities.
Test 4 Test 6
II only II in the mix HFT in the mix mix
Liquidity Consumers 99.898 99.854 99.994 99.924
Liquidity Providers 100.168 100.094 100.157 100.125
Average 99.91 99.864 99.974 99.919
Spread ψ 0.180 0.272 0.052 0.162
Spread ψ (bps) 18 27 5 16
Table 5 Expected transaction prices and spread in the model
7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how MFG (Mean Filed Games, [Lasry and Lions, 2007])
can be used to model orderbook dynamics. At the junction of structural ap-
proaches (see [Ros¸u, 2009] and [Foucault et al., 2005]) and flow driven ones
(see [Gareche et al., 2013]), the mean field game render the strategic behaviour
of traders, leading to partial derivative equations that can be numerically
solved, and partly reduced to simpler dynamics (Section 2 introduces mean
field games).
The application presented here used a stylized orderbook model in which:
– each side of the orderbook (buy or sell) is captured by one variable: its size
(i.e. the number of orders waiting in each queue);
– the “fair” or “latent” price is stable, since we focus on microstructure effects
on the traded price;
– the market impact of a trade is close to linear;
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– the orderbook has an infinite resiliency, in the sense that its shape does not
change through time: when liquidity is consumed in one queue, its shape
readjusts immediately to a linear one (even if its size changes).
The trading strategies of the investors are described by:
– their arrival rate λ, following an homogenous Poisson process;
– the average size of their orders q;
– their waiting cost c: the larger they are, the more impatient the investor;
– a fraction of the orders of investors have an infinite impatience: we call
them “non SOR (Smart Order Router) users” since they are not patient
enough to follow a liquidity-driven microscopic trading strategy. They can
be considered as having an infinite waiting cost.
Section 4 studies the dynamics of such a model and Section 6.1 shows that
such a stylized modelling give birth to realistic dynamics: with one class only
of investors, stable states of liquidity imbalance can appear. This can be read
as a justification for the introduction of the role of market makers.
In a third step of our reasoning, we introduce HFT (High Frequency
Traders) with the hope they will assume this market making role. Consis-
tently with [Menkveld, 2010] and [Brogaard et al., 2012], they are modelled
as: fast, using smaller orders than institutional investors, and taking decisions
according to the immediate state of the orderbook (in our vocabulary, they
are “Smart Order Router” users). It is important to underline that they have
not a different impatience (i.e. waiting cost per share) than other investors.
Section 6.2.1 extends the approach developed in Section 4 to a model with
two types of investors (to be applied to institutional ones and HFT). We then
study numerically the properties of markets with institutional investors and
HFTs, looking for an answer to regulators and policy makers questions about
the effect of mixing two so different classes of market participants. First note
that our results in terms of invariant measure distribution are consistent with
data explorations conducted in [Gareche et al., 2013].
Qualitatively, our conclusions are that the introduction of HFT improves
the usual measures of the efficiency of the price formation process: the stable
states of offer and demand are more balanced and the effective bid-ask spread
is smaller than without HFTs. But the observed improvement is at the exclu-
sive advantage of the HFTs: the effective bid-ask spread paid by institutional
investors is largest than before the introduction of HFT. Of course these con-
clusions are conditioned to the accuracy of our stylized model; nevertheless
they can explain the disjunction between the claims of institutional investors
(that, for them, the price formation process is more difficult to deal with in
presence of HFTs) and the objective improvement of measurements of the
state of liquidity since HFT activity increased.
Hence this paper is not only a contribution to the modelling of order-
book dynamics, showing how a MFG-approach can conciliate structural and
flow-driven approaches. It provides a qualitative analysis of the role of High
Frequency Trading in electronic markets. It also underlines the lack of liquidity
measurements adapted to the current market microstructure.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 52
Looking at equations (AR++ ) and (AR−+ ) we notice that at the boundary there is a jump
causing a change of sign of the coefficient multiplying the derivatives (under the basic as-
sumption λ ≥ λ−). Therefore, at this point we must have
λ−
x0
(
δ
x0 − q
− u˜) = c
q
. (36)
On the other hand, as the seller’s routing decision R⊕s jumps from 1 to 0, we must have
u˜ =
−δ
y0 − q
. (37)
Combining (36) and (37) we get the equality:
ηx0 =
1
x0 − q
+
1
y0 − q
,
where (same definition as in Proposition 52):
η :=
c
δqλ−
.
It follows that the diagonal point of the boundary M0 is the point (equation 29 of Proposition
52)
(x∗0, x
∗
0) = (q +
√
q2 + 8/η)/2
and that the boundary is defined by the parametric equation of Proposition 52:
(x0, y0) =
(
x0, l(x0) := q +
(
ηx0 − 1
x0 − q
)−1)
, ∀x0 ≥ x∗0.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 53
Unfortunately, looking at equations (BR−+ ) and (BR−− ) we conclude that we cannot adopt
the same reasoning since the sign of the coefficients multiplying the derivative terms does
not change.
We use another strategy. We solve v˜ analytically all along the characteristic line y1 = x1−k,
and then intersect the solution v˜ with δ
x1−q .
Along the characteristic x = y + k, we introduce the function
f(y) = v˜(y + k, y).
Looking at equation (25), we get the generic form of the ordinary differential equation (ODE
for short) satisfied by f :
f ′ +
a
y
f +
( b
y(y − q) + d
)
= 0, (38)
where
a = 1 + λ/λ−, b = δ(1 + λ/λ−), d = −δη, on R−+.
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We use the variation of constant method to solve equation (38).
The homogeneous solution is f(y) = y−a times a constant. Now let the constant varies as a
function g(x). We have f ′ = g′y−a − agy−a−1. Substituting in (38) we obtain:
g′(y) = −b y
a−1
y − q − dy
a.
This function is easy to integrate numerically. However in order to stay working with an-
alytical formulas, we make the approximation y − q ≈ y for small q (recall that all this
analytical part focus on the small q first order approximation). Now we are in the position
to integrate the derivative g′.
We get
f(y) = g(y)y−a = (κ y−a − b
a− 1y
−1 − d
a+ 1
y).
Now we have to compute the constant κ. Recall that we are working on the line (y + k, y)
and on the region R−+ so that we are solving the ODE with an initial condition on M0,
which is known to be (x0, l(x0)).
Consequently we have to look at f as a family (fk) of functions indexed by k ∈ R+. On the
characteristic line starting at x0 − l(x0), the function is given by
fx0−l(x0)(y) = (C(x0) y−a −
b
a− 1y
−1 − d
a+ 1
y), ∀y ≥ l(x0). (39)
The core argument to compute the constant parameter C(x0) for the solution on the char-
acteristic (y + k, y), with k = x0 − l(x0), is to remark that:
fk(y) = v˜(y + k, y) = −u˜(y, y + k) = −fk(y + k).
Then, the initial condition equality
fx0−l(x0)(l(x0)) = −fx0−l(x0)(x0),
automatically gives the expression of C:
C(x0) = δ
(1 + λ−/λ)[x−10 + l(x0)
−1]− η
1+λ/λ− [x0 + l(x0)]
x
−(1+λ/λ−)
0 + l(x0)
−(1+λ/λ−)
, (40)
where the last equality holds since the equation of u˜ on R+− matches the equation of v˜ on
R+−.
Consequently, the analytical solution is given by (39)-(40).
Finally we are in the position to compute the parametric curve of the boundary between
the two regions R−+ and R−−.
To do so we look for the point (x1, y1) = (y1 + k, y1) such that v˜(x1, y1) =
δ
x1−q .
More precisely, M1 is defined by: (y1 + x0 − l(x0), y1), ∀x0 ≥ x∗0, where (equation 31 of
Proposition 53)
y1 verifies fx0−l(x0)(y1) =
δ
y1 + x0 − l(x0)− q
.

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A.3 Local equations of the four regions (second order equations)
Define Λ = λ+ λ−. Let us now give the local equations on the same four regions.
(AR++ ) 0 =
[λ−
x
(pb(x)− u)− c
]
+ [λ− λ−](∂xu+ ∂yu) + q
(λ−
x
∂xu+
Λ
2
∆u
)
,
(BR++ ) 0 =
[λ−
y
(ps(y)− v) + c
]
+ [λ− λ−](∂xv + ∂yv) + q
(λ−
y
∂yv +
Λ
2
∆v
)
,
(AR−+ ) 0 =
[λ−
x
(pb(x)− u)− c
]
+ [−λ−](∂xu+ ∂yu) + q
(λ−
x
∂xu+
λ−
2
∆u+ λ∂yyu
)
,
(BR−+ ) 0 =
[Λ
y
(ps(y)− v) + c
]
+ [−λ−](∂xv + ∂yv) + q
(Λ
y
∂yu+
λ−
2
∆u+ λ∂yyv
)
,
(AR+− ) 0 =
[Λ
x
(pb(x)− u)− c
]
+ [−λ−](∂xu+ ∂yu) + q
(Λ
x
∂xu+
λ−
2
∆u+ λ∂xxu
)
,
(BR+− ) 0 =
[λ−
y
(ps(y)− v) + c
]
+ [−λ−](∂xv + ∂yv) + q
(λ−
y
∂yu+
λ−
2
∆u+ λ∂xxv
)
,
(AR−− ) 0 =
[Λ
x
(pb(x)− u)− c
]
+ [−Λ](∂xu+ ∂yu) + q
(Λ
x
∂xu+
Λ
2
∆u
)
,
(BR−− ) 0 =
[Λ
y
(ps(y)− v) + c
]
+ [−Λ](∂xv + ∂yv) + q
(Λ
y
∂yv +
Λ
2
∆v
)
.
(41)
Where ∆ stands for the Laplacian operator:
∆f = ∂xxf + ∂yyf.
Remark that, compared to equations (28), both a diffusion term and a drift term
appear.
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